What's the end game here? I agree with the dissent. Why not make it 30 seconds?

Once we cross the threshold of "I absolutely have to automate everything or it's not viable to use TLS anymore", why do we care about providing anything beyond ~48 hours? I am willing to bet money this threshold will never be crossed.

This feels like much more of an ideological mission than a practical one, unless I've missed some monetary/power advantage to forcing everyone to play musical chairs with their entire infra once a month...

Heh, working with a number of large companies I've seen most of them moving to internally signed certs on everything because of ever shortening expiration times. They'll have public certs on edge devices/load balancers but internal services with have internal CA signed certs with long expire times because of the number of crappy apps that make using certs a pain in the ass.

As I said in another thread, basically that will kill any possibility to do your own CA for your own subdomain. Only the big one embedded in browser will have the receive to have their own CA certificate with whatever period they want...

And in term of security, I think that it is a double edged sword:

- everyone will be so used to certificates changing all the time, and no certificate pinning anymore, so the day were China, a company or whoever serve you a fake certificate, you will be less able to notice it

- Instead of having closed systems, readonly, having to connect outside and update only once per year or more to update the certificates, you will have now all machines around the world that will have to allow quasi permanent connections to random certificate servers for the updating the system all the time. If ever Digicert or Letsencrypt server, or the "cert updating client" is rooted or has a security issue, most servers around the world could be compromised in a very very short time.

As a side note, I'm totally laughing at the following explanation in the article:

   47 days might seem like an arbitrary number, but it’s a simple cascade:
   - 47 days = 1 maximal month (31 days) + 1/2 30-day month (15 days) + 1 day wiggle room

So, 47 is not arbitrary, but 1 month, + 1/2 month, + 1 day are not arbitrary values...

I really wish encryption and identity weren't so tightly coupled in certificates. If I've issued a certificate, I _always_ care about encryption, but sometimes do not care about identity.

For those times when I only care about encryption, I'm forced to take on the extra burden that caring about identity brings.

Pet peeve.

This is great news. This would blow a hole in two interesting places where leaf-level certificate pinning is relied upon:

1. mobile apps.

2. enterprise APIs. I dealt with lots of companies that would pin the certs without informing us, and then complain when we'd rotate the cert. A 47-day window would force them to rotate their pins automatically, making it even worse of a security theater. Or hopefully, they switch rightly to CAA.